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Abstract
We investigate, using vector autoregressions (VAR) and Panel Data Anal-
ysis, the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in Pakistan. Empirical
evidence suggests that the ’bank lending channel’ is at work at the aggregate
level. Loans, deposits and government securities all reduce after a shock to the
monetary policy. When we examine bank heterogeneity in terms of size, liq-
uidity and capitalization, the results are mixed. Size is found to be a relevant
characteristic. Capitalization, measured by excess capital, is also somewhat
effective. Thus, small sized and capital constrained banks respond more to
monetary policy signals. Liquidity and the traditional measure of capital, on
the other hand, are found to be weaker characteristics. Moreover, the results
suggest that the market for loans has a stationary size distribution (no monop-
olistic tendencies) in Pakistan.
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1 Introduction
This paper concerns with investigating whether in a country like Pakistan, in which
the financial sector is dominated by banks, monetary transmission takes place through
the Bank Lending Channel (BLC) and what could be the major factors that contribute
to the existence (or non-existence) of this channel in the country.
In bank lending channel (BLC), as traditionally conceived1, a central bank during
monetary contraction phase reduces banks’ reserves through open market operations.
This fall in reserves results in reduction in reservable deposits and a simultaneous
increase in government bond holdings of the banks. If banks are unable to compen-
sate for the fall in reservable deposits by raising additional deposits to meet reserve
requirements, they will be required to make further adjustments on the asset side of
their balance sheet. Since loan commitments make it difficult for banks to immedi-
ately reduce lending, they generally respond by selling off their liquid securities to
reconcile with the decline in deposits2. If liquid securities are sufficient and cost effec-
tive, the decline on the asset side may entirely be restricted to a decline in securities
with no impact on loans. Otherwise, the amount of loans provided by the banks is
reduced in the medium to long term.
This traditional notion of BLC has, however, been challenged by researchers later
on. Notably, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) have argued that the earlier explanation
of BLC referred to pre 1980 period in the United States, when institutional structure
supported the assumptions of the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model. For example,
banks at that time under regulation ’Q’ could not pay interest rates on deposits
above ceilings and reserve requirements were much more severe. In recent years,
though, there are no such regulatory requirements and markets for bank liabilities
have become deep. Moreover, the conduct of monetary policy has shifted from using
quantities to using prices (interest rates)3.
The existence of BLC has, therefore, been argued primarily on the basis of non-
existence of a perfectly elastic demand for bank liabilities partly due to ’external
finance premium’4 that the banks have to pay. The cost and availability of external
funds depend upon the perceived creditworthiness of the borrowing institution which,
1(See e.g., Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke, 1993; Kashyap and Stein, 1995)
2The underlying assumption behind the behavior of the banks is that loans and bonds are not
perfect substitutes (Bernanke, 1993).
3This refers to the pre-crises period of 2008 when monetary policy was exclusively being conducted
through interest rates and terminologies such as ’quantitative easing’ were not common.
4External finance premium is defined as the difference between funds generated from external
sources(issuance of equity or bonds) and internal sources (retained earnings)
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in turn, depends upon its assets quality (primarily credit quality) (Bernanke, 2007).
Any increase in interest rates is assumed to alter the investor’s perception about the
quality of the credit portfolio of the bank5 and hence its creditworthiness, thereby
increasing the external finance premium for the bank. The banks are assumed to
transfer this premium on generating funds to the bank-dependent borrowers in terms
of cost or availability of credit or both.
So, when a central bank increases interest rates it increases the risk premium that
the banks have to pay on raising funds. This would result in an increase in the costs
of funds for the banks more than the increase dictated by the interest rates alone.
The supply of loans shifts inwards and the bank dependent borrowers feel the squeeze.
Their own external finance premium is raised resulting in a decline in off-take of loans,
thereby reducing the output and hence aggregate demand. This is how BLC amplifies
the monetary policy signals.6’7
Both the theoretical explanations of BLC are based on some key assumptions.
First, to a large extent, the economy has to be a bank dependent economy. This would
imply that there are some borrowers who would be unable to generate funds from
other sources after bank loans have been curtailed. Second, changes in interest rate
and the conduct of open market operations should largely be in the same direction8.
This would allow the BLC to work both through the traditional and revised channels.
Third, the direction of changes in external finance premium and interest rate should
also be in the same direction, if indeed increase in interest rate increases the risk
premium and vice verse. Fourth, there needs to be a positive correlation between
changes in policy rate and increase in non-performing loans, so as to confirm the
investor’s perception about higher rates leading to more defaults.
The BLC hypothesis has been tested popularly across United States, Euro area
as well as developing economies at the aggregate level (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder,
1992; Ehermann et al., 2001; Hernando et al., 2001; Al-Mashat, 2003). However, the
difficulty in separating the impact of monetary policy on loan supply or loan demand
using aggregate data has led researchers to focus on investigating the response of
5mainly due to information asymmetries (moral hazard and adverse selection) resulting in higher
non-performing loans.
6Apart from the above two explanations, literature has continued to refine the theory of how
BLC might exist (e.g. See Disyatat, 2011). But, these alternative explanations are not the focus of
current empirical investigation.
7In addition to above theoretical explanations it has also been suggested that apart from loan
commitments, banks may in fact also desire to retain customers and in doing so can decide not to
pass on the impact of monetary tightening to borrowers in the form of increased cost of funds.
8Increase in policy rate accompanied by mop-ups, for example.
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banks to the monetary policy shocks based on their individual balance sheet char-
acteristics (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000). They contend that the loan supply
behavior differs among banks because they differ in their abilities to insulate their
loan portfolios from monetary policy shocks. These differences are mainly derived
from bank specific characteristics such as size, liquidity and degree of capitalization.
It is argued that small, less liquid and least capitalized banks may not be able to
insulate their loan portfolios from a tight monetary policy and hence would amplify
the monetary policy signal (Ehermann et al., 2001).
Empirical literature that has used disaggregated bank data to identify BLC,
presents a mixed picture. Kashyap and Stein (2000), Farinha et al. (2001) and Brooks
(2007) found empirical evidence in support of the existence of BLC in United States
of America, Portugal and Turkey, respectively. On the other hand, Coll et al. (2005)
found bank lending channel of monetary transmission mechanism to be non-existent
in Venezuela. Similarly, Favero et al. (1999) tested the existence of a bank lending
channel for four European countries and found no evidence of a lending channel.
However, they did find that small banks use their excess liquidity to expand loans
during a contractionary phase; contrary to the predictions of the lending hypothesis.
The motivation for this study is primarily based on our understanding of the
structure of the banking sector in Pakistan, besides the regulatory environment. The
country is a bank-dependent economy with banking sector constituting 74 percent
share in total financial assets. Most of the borrowings by the private sector takes
place through banks and capital markets are not fully developed. Banks rely heavily
on deposits for their source of loanable funds as raising funds externally, through sale
of shares or bonds, is costly.
The regulatory environment has also been challenging. In 2008, State Bank of
Pakistan has introduced a floor on interest rate paid on savings deposits, which has
effectively raised the marginal cost for the banks. The reserve requirements, on the
other hand, have been lax throughout recent history and have seldom been used
for routine monetary policy operations. Interest rate is the dominant tool used for
conducting monetary policy. (Few sentences about BLC evidence as per data..).
Thus Pakistan, apparently, has some of the theoretical underpinnings needed for the
existence of BLC.
Moreover, there are currently limited studies that have attempted to test the
Bank Lending Channel in Pakistan. Notably three studies have investigated how
bank lending responds to changes in monetary policy. Agha et al. (2005) test the
bank lending channel at an aggregate level using VAR and find that monetary policy
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tightening in particular, negatively affects domestic demand in Pakistan and that
banks play an important role in propagating monetary policy shocks to the real
sector.
Choudhary et al. (2012) also provides evidence that a credit channel exists in Pak-
istan and contend that the role of banks in intermediation is a ’non-neutral’ one. They
empirically test the existence of a bank lending channel by using loan information
bank-borrower wise. They find that bank size and borrower type influences how loan
prices are determined. They also conclude that despite a similar mix of strong and
weak borrowers at both strong and weak banks, smaller banks with weaker balance
sheet responds strongly to changes in policy.
Recently, Zaheer et al. (2013), using quarterly data, have found BLC to be at
work in Pakistan for conventional banks. They conclude that small banks with liquid
balance sheets cut their lending less than other small banks and that big banks
maintain their lending irrespective of their liquidity position.
This paper attempts to add to the growing literature about BLC in Pakistan.
Similar to Zaheer et al. (2013), we use bank-wise balance sheet data to investigate
whether heterogeneity among banks, affects their loan supply behavior as proclaimed
under the bank lending channel. We measure bank heterogeneity by a number of bank
characteristics including size, liquidity and capitalization. Following Gambacorta
(2005), we also measure the capital constraint of the bank by introducing a new
measure which captures capital in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a longer
sample than Zaheer et al. (2013) and present long term elasticities.
We also employ a number of empirical techniques to test the effectiveness of BLC.
Initially, we group the banks as per their characteristics and use VAR to test the po-
tency of the relationship between monetary policy and bank lending after controlling
for the demand factors. Later, we employ panel estimators (Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) and its variants) to confirm the results.
We find evidence that the bank lending along with deposits and liquid assets
contracts significantly after monetary tightening at the aggregate level. So, after a
monetary policy shock the reduction in lending does not imply a simple reallocation
of assets from advances to government securities but there is significant reduction in
cash and government bonds as well, a necessary condition for bank lending channel
to work
Results also suggest that the heterogeneity characteristics ’size’ and ’capitaliza-
tion’ as measured by capitalization 2 are relevant for the effectiveness of BLC in
Pakistan. Small banks react more strongly than other banks and so do banks with
5
less capital in excess of regulatory requirements. Liquidity and Capitalization 1 are
found to be weaker distinguishing characteristics. However, our assumptions about
the linear impact of liquidity supporting the growth of advances is confirmed. Results
also confirm the assumption about market for loans having stationary size distribution
(no monopolistic tendencies).
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the banking
sector in Pakistan. Section 3 presents data and subsection 3.1 discusses summary
statistics of the banks’ balance sheets in Pakistan. Section 4 covers methodology
adopted. Section 5 presents results and finally Section 6 concludes.
2 Banking Sector Characteristics in Pakistan
The current banking sector structure in Pakistan is a result of financial sector re-
forms initiated during the 1990s with an intent to creating a financial system that
was competitive, efficient, practiced good governance and followed market-based fun-
damentals. Reforms covered seven important areas: financial liberalization, institu-
tional strengthening, domestic debt, monetary management, banking laws, foreign
exchange and capital markets. These reforms led to significant retraction of govern-
ment control over financial institutions9 and a spurt in new entrants10.
With the reforms continuing, financial sector started to witness a wave of mergers
and acquisitions, reducing the number of financial institutions from 197 in 2000 to
178 in 2002 (SBP, 2003). Within the banking sector, mergers and acquisitions as a
result of an increase in minimum paid-up capital, tax incentives and removal of legal
hurdles (SBP, 2003), led to a fall in the number of banks from 44 in 2000 (SBP, 2008)
to 38 by 2012 (SBP, 2013a). This, however, did not lead to an increase in market
concentration; after mergers market concentration of the top five financial institutions
actually declined (SBP, 2011).
Banks in Pakistan have always constituted the largest share in total financial
assets. In 2011 this share was more than 74 percent (SBP, 2012). National Savings
Schemes of Central Directorate of National Savings (CDNS)) constituted the second
highest share of 17 percent with the remaining share (4.7 percent) represented by
Non Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs)). From corporate borrowers’ perspective,
9Public sector ownership in overall financial sector (including banks, Non-Bank Financial Insti-
tutions (NBFIs) and Central Directorate of National Savings (CDNS)) declined from 94.7 percent
in 1990 (SBP, 2002) to 38.9 percent in 2005 (SBP, 2006).
10The number of financial institutions increased from 63 in 1990 (SBP, 2002) to 197 in 2000 (SBP,
2003).
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bank loans are a major source of financing due to lack of depth in the equity market.
The debt equity ratio of 1.93 percent in 2012 indicates that the corporate sector
is financing its growth through bank borrowings (SBP, 2013b). Therefore, banking
sector in Pakistan incontrovertibly dominates the financial sector and serves as major
source of financing in the economy.
Deposits constitute the largest source of funds for the banking sector. In 2012
deposits financed 75 percent of the total assets of the banking sector. The year-
on-year (YoY)growth in deposits is 16.8 percent in 2012. While, due to buildup of
retained earnings, improvements in revaluation surplus and some equity injections
to meet the minimum capital requirements, the YoY growth in equity turn out to
be 12.5 percent in 2012. The reliance on deposits, though not uncommon, makes it
expensive for the banks to arrange funding from alternative sources thereby increasing
their external finance premium. A high correlation of 0.7 between the SBP discount
rate or policy rate and the spread between policy rate and average cost of funds11,
during the period 2004-2012, suggest that banks cost of funds rise more than the rise
dictated by increase in interest rate alone. This implies that in the event of a rise
in interest rates banks face an increase in cost of raising additional external funds
which hampers their capacity to compensate for a fall in deposits on their liability
side, lending credence to the existence of a bank lending channel in Pakistan12.
Deposits of the banking system are protected under an implicit guarantee of the
Government of Pakistan thereby making the banking system susceptible to excessive
risk taking behavior on their asset side. This could be one of the reasons that non-
performing loans to advances ratio (gross) in Pakistan has remained above 10 percent
since 2008. Moreover, a positive correlation of 0.56 exists between non-performing
loans and short term interest rate (TB3). This provides support for the BLC ar-
gument which postulates that in an increasing interest rate environment, investors
will perceive banks as riskier avenues for their investments, therefore, making it dif-
ficult for banks to attract additional external financing. However, it is pertinent to
note that after facing a rise in NPLs during 2008, banks became risk averse and in-
creasingly began to channel their funds towards government securities, considerably
altering their portfolio mix. This conscience decision on part of banks could have
made BLC less potent.
Prior to reforms, monetary management was conducted through direct controls in-
11We use average rate paid on funds here which is Mark-up/Return/Interest Expense divided by
average funds.
12(See Horva´th et al., 2006) for similar comments in case of Hungary.
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volving allocation of bank-wise credit ceilings and maintenance of a prescribed credit
to deposit ratios. The cash reserve requirement (CRR) was generally quite stringent
and statutory liquidity requirement (SLR) was kept high 13. SBP also provided subsi-
dized financing for exports, agriculture, locally manufactured machinery, refinancing
to Federal Bank for Cooperatives and Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan.
Therefore, monetary transmission mechanism was distorted, credit distribution was
skewed and probably out of line with real demand.
Post-reforms, however, witnessed a gradual shift towards adoption of indirect in-
struments as tools of monetary policy. Up until August 2009, broad money (M2) ex-
pansion served as an intermediate target for targeting CPI inflation and GDP growth,
achieved through use of Reserve Money (RM) as operational target. After August
2009, interest rate corridor was introduced with the overnight money market repo
rate serving as the operational target of monetary policy, supported by appropriate
liquidity management, mainly through Open Market Operations (OMOs). This can
be seen in figure 1 where episodes of monetary tightening (easing), are supported
by greater number and volumes of mop-ups (injections) by the central bank. There-
fore,one of the key assumptions of the traditional channel under which BLC operates,
is being partially met in case of Pakistan. Moreover, SBP has also used CRR and
SLR as policy instruments solely to manage liquidity levels and ensure stability but
monetary policy framework remains fairly independent of the use of these tools to
supplement monetary policy decisions.
3 Data
Quarterly balance sheet data of 32 commercial banks in Pakistan from June 2002
to September 2012 has been used in this study; a total of 42 quarters. Commercial
banks include public sector banks, local private banks and foreign banks. At the start
of the period under review, there were 37 commercial banks which have reduced to
34 by September 2012. Exclusion of 2 new banks from the sample further reduced it
to 32 banks14. The period under review has witnessed emergence of 7 new banks and
there were 16 bank mergers. When dealing with mergers and acquisitions of banks,
we adopt the treatment of reconstructing the balance sheet backwards of the merged
13Prior to reforms, SLR was gradually increased from 15 percent of demand and time liabilities
in 1948 to 40 percent in 1992. During the reforms in 1990s this ratio was gradually reduced and
currently stands at 19 percent of demand liabilities.
14ICBC and Sindh Bank with 8 and 5 observations, respectively, were removed.
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entities as the sum of the merging banks 15. After all these adjustments the total
observations worked out to be 1,268 for the raw data.
We construct bank characteristic variables as per literature (Ehermann et al.,
2001; Gambacorta, 2005). Size is measured as log of total assets, liquidity as liquid
assets to total assets and capitalization as shareholders’ equity to total assets16. There
is some debate in the literature about measurement of capital constraint of the bank.
Some authors simply use capital in hand (as mentioned earlier) while others suggest
using capital in excess of regulatory requirement as an indicator of bank’s true capital
constraint (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Gambacorta, 2005). Following the later
approach, however, is not simple in our case.
In case of Pakistan there are two separate capital requirements in place; one is the
minimum capital requirement (MCR), which is an absolute measure and the other
is the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), which is in fractional terms. To be adequately
capitalized, a bank has to meet both these prudential requirements of the State Bank
of Pakistan. If a bank violates any one of the two requirements it is termed as capital
deficient. Therefore, it is imperative to look at both the requirements in tandem
to ascertain the excess capital position of a bank. In our sample some banks are
compliant in terms of MCR but deficient in terms of CAR. We, therefore, decided to
construct a separate measure named ’Capitalization 2’ which reflects the true extent
of excess capital held by a bank in a particular period. It captures the ’minimum’ of
the two capitals held by each bank in excess of the regulatory requirement17.
Liquidity and Capitalization 1 have been normalized with respect to their averages
over the entire sample. Size and Capitalization 2 are in nominal terms and to remove
trends they are normalized with respect to the average of each single period18. Since
Capitalization 2 represents minimum of the two excess capital requirements (CAR
and MCR) in nominal terms, there are some observations for which the values of
the variable turn out to be negative. Therefore, Capitalization 2 is first transformed
using Inverse Hyperbolic Transformation19 and then normalized.
15See Peek and Rosengren (1995); Kishan and Opiela (2000); Farinha et al. (2001) and Gambacorta
(2005) for similar treatment.
16Shareholders’ equity includes Share Capital, Reserves and Unappropriated profits
17Appendix C provides details about merger treatment of banks, variables used and their con-
struction and the data cleaning process.
18We follow Ehermann et al. (2001); Farinha et al. (2001); Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and
Gambacorta (2005) in this practice.
19y = ln
(
x+
√
(x2 + 1)
)
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Sizeit = log TAit −
∑N
i=1 log TAit
Nt
Liquidityit =
LAit
TAit
−
 T∑
t=1
∑N
i=1
LAit
TAit
Nt

Capitalization1it =
SEit
TAit
−
 T∑
t=1
∑N
i=1
SEit
TAit
Nt

Capitalization2it = Cap2Tit −
∑N
i=1Cap2Tit
Nt
Where TA is Total Assets, LA is Liquid Assets, SE is Shareholders’ Equity, N is
the total number of banks, T is the total number of quarters and Cap2T is the
transformed value of Capitalization 2.
The stance of monetary policy is measured using short term interest rate20. To
control for the demand side factors we have included industrial production index
(IPI), consumer price index (CPI) and fiscal deficit (FD)21. All the variables except
short term interest rate are real, in log form and seasonally adjusted.
3.1 Summary Statistics of Banks’ Balance Sheet
Table 1 presents the summary statistics (mean values of some selected balance sheet
variables) of all banks during the sample period (June 2002 to September 2012).
Banks have been grouped into three subcategories under size, liquidity and the two
measures of capital availability based on percentile ranking of each bank, in each
quarter and category. The criteria used to split the sample is further explained in the
footnote to table 1.
Some clear patterns emerge from the data. Small banks are more liquid but hold
fewer government securities in their liquid assets portfolio. This maybe because small
banks are net lenders in the interbank market and need bigger buffer stocks of cash
due to their inability to raise external finance easily on short notice Kashyap and
Stein (1995).
The assets side of small banks shows that they have relatively lower exposure
in loans compared to medium and large banks. The exposure in loans increases
20We have used interest rate on 3-months Treasury Bill rate (TB3), overnight interest rate (ONR)
and SBP Repo rate as our measures of monetary policy. The results presented here are on the basis
of TB3. Results based on other measures are similar in nature.
21Fiscal deficit has been included as a control because government borrowing from banking sector
in Pakistan has usually been excessive and it is expected that it will capture any crowding out effect.
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with bank size22. This implies that, on the one hand, smaller banks with limited
market outreach, posited by a small branch network, cannot reach some segments
of loan demand and, on the other hand, these banks maybe putting a larger weight
to liquidity concerns (as evident from their liquidity ratios). On the liability side,
the deposit to liability ratio of small banks is lower than ratio for large banks; an
observation consistent with the literature Favero et al. (1999); Farinha et al. (2001).
The volume of borrowings from central banks by small banks is also low.
Small banks are better capitalized in terms of CAR and Capitalization 1. This
means that small banks are considered resilient and are likely to absorb shocks em-
anating from changes in monetary policy. However, small banks have lower average
excess capital as measured by Capitalization 2; implying that they are capital con-
straint. If excess capital does in fact play a role for small banks then the question
whether their loan supply is responsive to monetary policy shock, becomes an empir-
ical one.
Less liquid banks—both least and mid liquid— are larger in size and relatively less
capital constrained as per capitalization 2. These banks have higher loans to deposits
ratio. Highly liquid banks, on the other hand, are smaller, have more deposits and
make less loans. Thus the more liquid the bank the smaller is its balance sheet size.
Also, its earning assets are concentrated in government securities. Thus, it is expected
that highly liquid banks may be able to shield their portfolio from adverse monetary
policy shock.
The contrasting pictures emerging from classification of banks as per size and
liquidity suggest that the interplay between the two factors might be nullifying the
effects of each other. It becomes important to test empirically whether large and
highly liquid banks are affected the least during monetary contraction phase or not.
As per Capitalization 1, highly capitalized banks are small and more liquid but
with lowest proportion of government securities in liquid assets. They have least
advances to assets and deposits to liabilities ratios. These pretty much mirror the
observations made for small banks. Similar observations were made in earlier litera-
ture as well. Farinha et al. (2001) observe that highly capitalized banks have lowest
proportion of government securities; similar to observations made in our data. Vihri-
ala (1997) found that in Finland the lower the degree of capitalization of a bank, the
more expansive was its loan supply.
Using Capitalization 2 as a measure, highly capitalized banks come out to be large
22This is in line with Farinha et al. (2001)’s study for Portuguese banks but contrary to Favero
et al. (1999) observations for Greek banks where small banks have a higher ratio of loans to assets.
11
and mid-liquid with loan exposure not much different from others. They are more
profitable than the rest of the banks. So, it is expected that highly capitalized banks
would be able to withstand adverse shocks.
It is interesting to note, the contrast between the two sets of statistics when the
banks are grouped as per Capitalization 1 and Capitalization 2. Least capitalized
banks, as per Capitalization 1, are those with highest asset base and advances but
low CAR. On the contrary, as per Capitalization 2, least capitalized banks are those
with lowest asset size, advances and CAR. This suggests that banks with higher Cap-
italization 1 ratio (usually small banks) can still be capital deficient (not meeting the
SBP prudential requirements), and would not have the capacity to insulate their lend-
ing portfolio during monetary tightening. It means that the argument that smaller
banks with minimum level of excess capital would find it difficult to raise funds and
insulate their loan portfolio from a monetary policy shock cannot be adequately cap-
tured by using Capitalization 1. Capitalization 2 captures the capital constraint of
the bank satisfactorily.
4 Methodology
In the first step of our analysis, we employ vector auto regression (VAR) methodology
to examine the effect of unanticipated monetary policy shock on industrial produc-
tion, prices and the bank balance sheet variables. We identify the following VAR
representation:
Yt =
p∑
i=1
ΨiYt−i + ΓXt + t (1)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables
including intercept, Ψj and Γ are matrices of coefficients and t is a vector of innova-
tions.
To keep VAR parsimonious we have used four variables of interest. We have
followed the widely used recursive identification scheme proposed by Bernanke and
Blinder (1992). It is argued in this scheme that the macro economic variables (such as
real output and prices) are observed contemporaneously by the policy makers and the
policy variable affect these macroeconomic variable with a lag. Thus macro economic
variables like output (IPI) , prices (CPI) and bank balance sheet variables (B) i.e
advances, government securities or deposits appear first and short term interest rate
(R) is placed last in the Choleski order. So our Y matrix takes the form:
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Yt = [IPI CPI B R]
We treated lag of fiscal deficit as an exogenous variable to control for demand for
credit by the government sector. We also included a dummy variable to control for
the balance of payment crisis of 2008 which resulted in outflow of foreign currency
deposits from the country.
Xt = [FD (−1) d]
Since the focus of the analysis is to identify the bank lending channel, so apart
from aggregate data we employed VAR on disaggregated data. For this purpose, we
have divided the banks into three sub-categories low, medium and high based on size,
liquidity and the two measures of capital. So in all, we have estimated thirty nine
different VARs.
According to Sims et al. (1990) estimating the VARs in levels (when some variables
are non stationary) does not affect the estimators consistency though it may affect
their efficiency. As our objective, at this stage, is not to determine efficient estimator
but to examine the relationship among variables, we have estimated the VARs in
levels (Favero, 2004; Aleem, 2010). Further, we have used optimal lag length of two
by looking largely at Bayesian Information Criteria and residual diagnostics. Several
other studies using quarterly data for this purpose have also used two lags as the
optimal lag length23.
In the second stage of the analysis, following Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000);
Ehermann et al. (2001); Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004); Gambacorta (2005) and
several others, we employ the following empirical specification to test whether banks
react differently to monetary policy shocks24.
∆Zit =µi +
4∑
j=1
αij∆Zit−j +
4∑
j=0
βj∆Rt−j +
4∑
j=0
ξj∆Xt−j + γiCit−1
+
4∑
j=1
ζijCit−1∆Rt−j + it
(2)
with i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T , where N is the number of banks, Zit the
23For instance see Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998); Morsink and Bayoumi (2001); Al-Mashat (2003);
Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) and Aleem (2010)
24The theoretical framework behind the empirical model is reported in Ehermann et al. (2001);
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and Zaheer et al. (2013)
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loans, deposits or liquidity of bank i in quarter t, Rt the monetary policy indicator,
Xt the industrial production, fiscal deficit and inflation, Cit the bank characteristics
i.e. size, liquidity, Capitalization 1 and Capitalization 2.
In order to capture the complete picture of ’bank lending channel’ in Pakistan,
we take changes in loans as the dependent variable in model 2 followed by changes in
deposits and liquidity. This allows us to test the BLC assertion that deposits, liquidity
and loans all react inversely to a monetary policy shock. We are also interested in
knowing whether bank specific characteristics i.e. size, liquidity and capitalization
have any direct linear effects. Therefore, besides βj’s for interest rate, the parameters
of interest in the regression analysis are ξj’s for bank characteristics and ζij’s on the
interaction terms. If indeed BLC is at work then we expect to have ∂Zit
∂Rit
< 0 for
Z equals advances, deposits and liquidity and significant positive values for ζij’s i.e.
∂2Zit
∂Cit∂Rit
> 0. For direct linear effects of bank characteristics we assume that higher
liquidity and capitalization would support stronger loan growth and hence ∂Zit
∂Cit
> 0
for C equals liquidity and capitalization. For C equals size we expect ∂Zit
∂Cit
< 0 based
on the assumption that market for loans has a stationary size distribution (Topi and
Vilmunen, 2001).
The analysis of the sample data has suggested the possibility of bank heterogeneity
in size along with liquidity to be of some consequence. This simply means that small
and least liquid banks should react strongly to the monetary policy shock than just
the small but highly liquid or least liquid but bigger bank. To check this hypothesis
we have estimated the following model:
∆Zit =µi +
4∑
j=1
αij∆Zit−j +
4∑
j=0
βj∆Rt−j +
4∑
j=0
ξj∆Xt−j + λiSit−1 + δiLit−1 + γiSit−1Lit−1
+
4∑
j=1
υijSit−1∆Rt−j +
4∑
j=1
ωijLit−1∆Rt−j +
4∑
j=1
ζijSit−1Lit−1∆Rt−j + it
(3)
where Zit now is the loans and deposits of bank i in quarter t, Sit is size and Lit is
liquidity.
If indeed our hypothesis is true and the interaction between size and liquidity is
important for the transmission of monetary policy impulses through the bank lending
channel then we expect ∂3Zit
∂Sit∂Lit∂Rit
< 0.
Along with the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), we es-
timate both models 2 and 3 using instrumental variable approach of Anderson and
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Hsiao (1982) and the system GMM methodology suggested by Blundell and Bond
(1998)25. The rationale is to ensure robustness of the results across estimators, be-
sides consistency and efficiency of the estimates. Relevant post estimation diagnostics
are performed for each estimator.
5 Results
We first report the results based on VAR and then panel estimation.
5.1 VAR Results
Figure 2 displays the responses of the balance sheet variables, at the aggregate level,
to an unanticipated shock to the monetary policy over a horizon of 15 quarters. A
positive innovation (one-standard-deviation shock) in interest rate causes a reduction
of 0.5 percent in deposits initially. The decline in deposits continue till the next
quarter (0.6 percent) but then slowly start to recover. By the fifth quarter, after the
shock, deposits have recovered somewhat and they maintain their new level going
forward. Thus, a positive monetary policy shock permanently declines the deposits
of the banks.
The impact on government securities is more pronounced and by the third quarter
a reduction of 2.3 percent has already taken place. That point onwards, however, the
government securities start to build up and by the end of eighth quarter they have
fully recovered. Going forward there is some buildup of government securities above
the initial level but it tapers off by the end of 15th quarter and the government
securities converge to their initial level.
There is a permanent decline in loans, however. By the fifth quarter loans reduce
by 1.2 percent and then start to pick up. Eventually, loans settle at a level which is
0.4 percent less than the initial level.
So we can observe the BLC at work in figure 2. After the monetary policy shock,
as the deposits fall, there is some decline in loans but there is a significant reduction in
government securities. The ease of liquidating government bonds against the contrac-
tual nature of loans explains the difference in rates of decline in the two assets of the
banks (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). To compensate for the fall in deposits banks,
initially, sell their government securities to protect their loan portfolio. But once the
25We also estimated the model using fixed effects, but unlike Zaheer et al. (2013) found the ’Nickell
bias’ to be substantive (Nickell, 1981).
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permanent nature of reduction in deposits become apparent, loans fall and the banks
re-accumulate their government securities portfolio to ward off future risks. The build
up of loans is not drastic partly due to a decline in lending ability of the banks and
partly due to subdued demand effects. Thus, the primary impact of fall in deposits,
in response to a monetary policy shock, is reflected entirely in loans (Bernanke and
Blinder, 1992; Aleem, 2010).
To carry further our analysis, we next report the VAR results based on the bi-
furcation of the sample into three categories based on bank characteristics i.e. size,
liquidity and capitalization.
5.1.1 Size
Figure 3 provides graphical illustration of the dynamic affect of interest rate inno-
vations on real advances, real government securities holdings and real deposits held
by small, medium and large categories of banks. In the sense of Kashyap and Stein
(1995, 2000), if a positive innovation in policy rate has greater dampening affect on
government securities and loans of small banks than that of large banks, the evi-
dence may be termed in favor of the bank lending channel. We first discuss IRFs
of small, Medium and large Banks separately and then compare the IRFs of these
heterogeneous categories to be able to comment upon the working of the bank lending
channel.
For small banks, the deposits do not decline immediately after the monetary policy
shock. They start falling after the second quarter and decline by 2.1 percent by the
5th quarter. Thereafter, they recover somewhat but settle at a level which is 0.5
percent lower than the initial level. The initial comfort provided by deposits, allows
the small banks to accumulate government securities and advances in the first quarter
probably reflecting the earning motive. As the deposits start to fall the government
securities and advances also decline.
Government securities holdings of small banks, in response to monetary policy
shock, start declining after the second quarter. This decline is, however, relatively
moderate i.e. 1.2 percent up to fourth quarter. This is followed by a quick replen-
ishment in the subsequent quarters. The securities holdings of the small banks in
the end settle at a level which is 2.4 percent higher than the initial level. This is
understandable because small banks, as noted earlier, have a strong preference for
liquid assets.
The real lending of small banks increases by 2.0 percent till the end of second
quarter. Subsequently, the fall in lending is quite rapid and by the fifth quarter it
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declines to a level which is 2.0 percent less than the initial level. Thereafter, lending
of small banks witnesses some partial recovery but real lending settles at a level lower
than initial level after the shock. Hence, an unanticipated monetary policy shock has
a permanent contractionary impact on deposits and lending of the small banks.
For medium size banks, monetary policy shock has a negative impact on deposits
immediately. Deposits decline by 1.5 percent by the second quarter. From there
onwards, deposits recover somewhat but continue to decline and reach at level which
is 1.2 percent lower than the initial level by the fifteenth quarter. The response of
government securities holding by the medium size banks to monetary policy shock
depicts relatively large swings. For instance, in the first two quarters, government
securities holdings by the medium size banks fall sharply by 2.2 percent followed by a
quick rise in the subsequent quarters. By the end of seventh quarter after the shock,
stock of these securities reaches 1.7 percent higher than the initial level. The sharp
fall in the first two quarters possibly reflects revaluation losses owing to rise in policy
rate while the reversal in the following quarters may depicts banks revived interest in
these securities due to better return. Afterwards, the stock of government securities
starts declining again as the deposits decline and advances recover somewhat. In the
end they settle down at lower than pre-shock level.
The lending of the medium size banks fall immediately after the monetary policy
shock. It decreases by 2.3 percent during the first four quarters. From the fifth
quarter onwards, it recovers partially and settles down at a stable path by the tenth
quarter. The lending in the final quarter is 1.3 percent lower than the initial level.
Thus monetary policy shock reduces deposits, government securities holdings and
lending of the medium size banks on permanent basis.
Looking at the IRFs of large size banks, total deposits fall by 0.8 percent during
the first three quarters. Thereafter, deposits recover and stabilize at 0.3 percent lower
than the initial level. Government securities holdings of the large banks fall by 2.7
percent in the first four quarters. This fall in stock of government securities may be
due to several reasons. First, with the supply side constraints on account of fall in
deposits, the large banks may liquidate some of the government securities to meet
their loan commitments. Second, as mentioned earlier, revaluation losses may also
lead to fall in government securities. Nonetheless, with the fall in lending and pick
in deposits, these banks start replenishing their stock of government securities from
the fifth quarter onwards. They are quite successful in this effort as they end up with
their stock of government securities only marginally lower (0.2 percent) lower than
the initial level.
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In the first two quarters, Large banks are able to shield their lending from mon-
etary policy shock. In the subsequent quarters, however, lending by the large banks
shows contraction. Specifically, it declines by 0.9 percent up till seventh quarter and
then recovers a bit. Towards the end, the lending stabilizes around 0.3 percent below
the pre-shock level. This shows that monetary policy shock has permanent negative
impact on the deposits, government securities and lending of large banks.
Clear evidence of the bank lending channel does not emerge if we observe the
relative strength of the IRFs of small, medium and large banks for advances, deposits
and government securities in figure 5. The dynamic impact of monetary policy shock
is relatively stronger on the lending of medium banks than that of small banks. Large
banks, however, are able to keep decline in their advances portfolio lower than small
banks. This is not fully in line with the prediction of BLC, where monetary policy
shock is expected to have stronger dampening impact on lending of the small banks
than that of medium and large size banks. In our case, it is the medium sized banks
which are affected more than small banks.
In case of deposits, the negative impact of monetary policy shock is visible for
medium and large banks at initial stage but not for small banks. However, once the
deposits of the small banks start to decline their fall is heavier. But, deposits of small
banks also recover rapidly and at the end their deposits reach a level which is lower
than large banks but higher than medium banks.
The behavior of government securities is also unexpected. Initially, the decline is
more for medium banks than for large and small banks. Later, however, the recovery
is bigger for medium banks. In the end, government securities settle at a level lower
than initial level for medium and large banks but at higher levels for small banks.
This behavior could be explained due to the strong desire of small banks for keeping
a sizable portion of their assets in liquid form to ward against adverse shocks. Thus
although interest rate has dampening impact on bank lending, government securities,
deposits and thereby aggregate demand (real output and prices) in all the cases, its
identification through heterogeneity in size of the banks is not clear cut and requires
further investigation.
5.1.2 Liquidity
For the bank lending channel to work, BLC predicts that innovation to policy rate
has larger negative impact on the lending of less liquid banks compared with medium
or most liquid banks. To see this, we discuss the IRFs of less liquid, medium liquid
and most liquid banks (Figure 3) followed by a discussion about their comparative
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strength (Figure 4).
For the least liquid banks, unanticipated monetary policy shock leads to a fall in
deposits, government securities and loans in the first two quarters. Following which a
quick but temporary recovery takes place and the three variables of interest eventually
settle down on a path, lower than their initial levels. These swings in IRF could be
due to several opposing forces at work. These banks have lowest liquidity but have
a bigger size and their advances to deposits ratio (ADRs) are the highest (see Table
xx). They are net borrowers in the interbank market and also borrow from State
Bank of Pakistan. So these banks have generally utilized their maximum capacity to
lend. Therefore, an adverse shock has an immediate impact on their balance sheets.
But, by virtue of their bigger size with extended branch network and their ability to
borrow they are able to recoup some of the initial losses. However, after fully utilizing
their capacity to borrow, they are unable to sustain the momentum and eventually
suffer.
Medium liquid banks appear to shield their balance sheet from Monetary policy
shock. After falling by 1.9percent by the end of seventh quarter, deposits increase
and by the fifteenth quarter deposits stabilize at 0.4 percent above the initial level.
Thus, monetary policy shock have negligible impact on the deposits of medium size
banks. The impact of monetary policy shock on government securities holdings of
medium liquid banks is not much different from that of deposits. For instance, gov-
ernment securities holdings of this category of banks declines by 2.5 percent in the
first four quarters. From fifth quarter onwards, they start replenishing the stock of
these securities and end up with the stock of government securities at 0.7 percent
higher than the initial level.
The impact of monetary policy shock on the lending of medium liquid banks is
nominal. In fact, lending increases by 3.9 percent in the first two quarters after the
shock. This considerable increase in lending is possibly due to two reasons. First, the
medium liquid banks may cater the market share lost by less liquid banks and second
fair degree of liquidity allows these banks to meet their loan commitments by drawing
down on their liquidity. From third quarter onward, however, lending by these banks
starts declining and by the end of sixth quarter it falls by 2.1 percent. Nevertheless,
lending by the medium liquid banks recover convincingly in the quarters to follow.
Finally, the lending by these banks stabilizes at a relatively higher level than the
pre-shock value.
With respect to most liquid banks, monetary policy shock seems to have no impact
on the real deposits, real government securities holding and real lending. For example,
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despite steep fall in the first two quarters, deposits of the most liquid banks increase
considerably. The sharp fall in deposits in the first two quarters may be explained
by the fact that most of the banks in this category are small size banks. Toward the
end, deposits of the most liquid banks are only marginally lower (0.2 percent) than
the initial level.
IRF of the government securities holding of the most liquid banks depicts similar
trend as deposits. In the initial two quarters, stock of government securities depletes
while it recovers in the latter quarters. Finally, the stock of government securities
end up at almost the pre-shock level. Despite considerable decline in the initial two
months, lending of the most liquid banks recovers markedly in the subsequent period.
It appears that monetary policy shock has no significant impact on the lending of the
most liquid banks.
The above discussion implies that BLC may be at work in case of liquidity. When
we look at figure 5 a somewhat vague picture emerges, though. It is the most liquid
banks that experience the highest decline in advances initially after the monetary
policy shock. Although their advances, at the end of the simulation period, are at a
level higher than least liquid banks, they are lower than medium liquid banks. BLC
implies stronger impact on low and medium liquid banks than for most liquid banks.
Thus, further investigation is required to get a definitive picture.
5.1.3 Capital
The cumulative IRFs of banks –bifurcated on the basis of Capitalization 1 and Cap-
italization 2– to policy rate shock are depicted in figure 4. Bank Lending Channel is
assumed to work if monetary policy shock has relatively greater dampening impact
on the lending of less capitalized banks than well capitalized banks. For this analysis
we first analyze the IRFs of less capitalized, medium capitalized and well capitalized
banks and then conduct their comparative analysis.
In case of Capitalization 1, IRFs of less capitalized banks suggests that monetary
policy shock has contractionary impact on real deposits, real lending and real govern-
ment securities. Deposits of the less capitalized banks, for example, declines by 14.0
percent in the first two quarters. Though deposits recover in the subsequent period,
they still end up at a level 1.0 percent lower than the initial level.
Government securities holdings of the less capitalized banks responds to monetary
shock in the similar fashion as deposits. In the first two quarters stock of government
securities falls sharply followed by partial recovery in the latter period. As the IRF
stabilizes, government securities are 1.6 percent lower than the initial level.
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Lending of the less capitalized banks is also negatively affected by the monetary
policy shock. This impact is quite strong in the initial two quarters when lending
by these banks falls by 14.1 percent. This impact is moderated to great extent in
the following quarters. Specifically, the lending stabilizes at 1.0 percent lower than
the initial level. Thus monetary policy shock has a permanent negative impact on
lending by the less capitalized banks.
For the medium capitalized banks, impact of monetary policy shock on deposits,
government securities and lending is negligible. Specifically, deposits of the medium
capitalized banks increase by 5.6 percent in the first two quarters after the shock.
From there onward deposits stabilizes at almost the initial level. Thus monetary pol-
icy shock does not seem to affect deposits of medium capitalized banks on permanent
basis.
The monetary shock does not appear to effect the government securities holding
of medium capitalized banks also. After around 3.0 percent increase in the first three
quarters, stock of government securities falls and revert back to the initial level.
In line with the changes in deposits, lending of the medium capitalized banks
appears to be less affected by monetary policy shock. After some movements, the
impact of monetary policy shock on lending by the medium size banks completely
dies down in the twelfth quarter.
For the well capitalized banks, monetary policy shock negatively impacts deposits,
lending and holdings of government securities in real terms. Nonetheless, this impact
is relatively moderate when compared with that of least capitalized banks. Initially,
deposits of well capitalized banks fall (3.1 percent in the first two quarters). However,
in the subsequent period, deposits recover noticeably and stabilize at 0.6 percent lower
than the initial level.
The impact of monetary policy shock on government securities holdings of the well
capitalized banks is slightly negative. Though government securities holdings fall by
2.5 percent in the initial two quarters, these banks replenish this stock from quarter
three onwards. As a result government securities holding almost reverts back to the
initial level.
Though moderately, lending of the well capitalized banks is negatively affected by
the monetary policy shock. Specifically this effect appears to be strong in the first two
quarters when lending decline by 2.1 percent. However, as these banks are in a good
position to raise funds from external sources, their lending recovers in the subsequent
quarters. This process continues till lending stabilizes to a new path which is 0.8
percent lower than the initial level. Thus monetary policy shock has a dampening
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but moderate impact on the lending of well capitalized banks.
Figure 6 shows that the innovation in policy rate has greater dampening impact
on the lending of less capitalized banks than that of well capitalized banks. But, it
is the medium capitalized banks which are effected the least. Thus, results as per
Capitalization 1 present are not conclusive.
In case of Capitalization 2, the results are mixed as well. Figures 4 and 6 show
that the lending of the least capitalized banks is affected more than the lending of
well capitalized banks but it recovers rapidly and at the end of the simulation period
of fifteen quarters it is not only well above the initial level but also more than medium
and well capitalized banks. The situation is similar in case of government securities
and deposits. Thus, further investigation is also required in this case to get a definitive
picture.
5.2 Panel Estimation
The main results of the estimation are summarized in Tables 2 to 13, which present
long run elasticities 26. We perform the estimations by considering each bank char-
acteristic separately. We look at the complete chain of BLC in estimations as our
dependent variable includes bank deposits, liquidity and loans.
5.2.1 Heterogeneity Factor: Size
As per the results shown in Table 2, the direct impact of monetary policy on loan
growth is negative but its interaction with size has a dampening effect on the fall in
growth of loans. The interaction term has the expected positive sign and is statis-
tically significant in two specifications (Columns 2 and 5). Thus, banks with larger
size are, to some extent, able to shield their loan portfolio from negative monetary
shocks in Pakistan.
Although, in case of deposits and liquidity, the monetary policy has an expected
negative impact on their growth (Tables 3 and 4), the distributional impact of size is
inconclusive. Generally, the interaction term has a an unexpected negative sign and
is statistically not different from zero except for one regression (Column 9, Table 3).
This implies that for deposits and liquidity, contrary to expectations, size is not an
important characteristic for banks in Pakistan. Large banks face similar problems like
small banks when mobilizing regular deposits, despite better geographical coverage.
They have larger volume of deposits but their funding needs are also large. As
26Long-run elasticities have been computed from the models using Delta Method.
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reported in Table 1, large banks have the lowest liquid assets to deposits ratio but a
higher advances to deposits ratio. Where large banks could have an edge over small
banks, in raising funds and shielding their loan portfolio, is the interbank market.
Large banks are usually the net borrowers in the interbank market while small banks
are the net lenders (1).
The linear impact of size on growth of advances is as per expectations. The
significant negative coefficient implies that the growth in loans is not an increasing
function of size. The market for loans in Pakistan has a stationary size distribution
or has a tendency to converge to a stationary size distribution (Topi and Vilmunen,
2001). In other words, the market for loans has not been monopolized by large banks
alone.
So, in the aftermath of an adverse monetary shock all banks, whether small or
large, witness a decline in their deposits, liquid assets and advances. The larger banks,
however, are able to shield their loan portfolio from declining to a certain degree. So
size matters for growth in advances but not for deposits and liquidity.
5.2.2 Heterogeneity Factor: Liquidity
The direct impact of monetary policy on growth in advances and deposits remains
negative (Tables 5 and 6). Higher liquidity seems to support the growth in advances
though, as the linear impact of liquidity on growth in advances is positive and signif-
icant. The overall impact of monetary policy on growth in advances of average liquid
bank is, however, inconclusive. The interaction term is alternating in sign and is
statistically insignificant throughout models. This indicates liquidity to be a weaker
factor for BLC in Pakistan besides probably some noise in the data.
These results could also be due to the fact that highly-liquid banks in our sample
are generally smaller in size and, as shown earlier, small banks are the hardest hit
after a monetary contraction. It may also be due to the fact that liquidity gives
the bank only temporary ability to face adverse shocks. As the consequences of the
shock grow, banks’ substitution of advances for government securities cannot continue.
Banks eventually rebuild their liquid assets at the cost of advances (See VAR results).
For deposits, the more liquid the bank the higher is the decline in its deposit
growth. Not only is the linear term negative and significant but the interaction
term is also negative and statistically significant. Thus, higher liquidity seems to be
accelerating the fall in deposits.
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5.2.3 Heterogeneity Factor: Capitalization
In case of capitalization, the monetary policy shock continue to adversely impact
growth in advances directly (Table 7 and Table 10). The linear term is, however,
positive and significant for capitalization 1 but negative and significant for capital-
ization 2. This implies that having excess capital does not in itself supports growth
in advances.
Though the traditional measure, capitalization 1, does not seem to fully capture
the distributional impacts of changes in monetary policy on advances (Tables 7), cap-
italization 2 that measures excess capital does (Tables 10). The interaction term has
the expected positive sign and is statistically significant in some regressions (Columns
8 and 9, Table 10). This means that banks with more excess capital available at their
disposal are able to stem the fall of advances after monetary tightening.
In terms of deposits growth, capitalization 1 and capitalization 2 both have oppo-
site impacts. The interaction term is positive and significant in regressions for capi-
talization 1 but negative and significant for capitalization 2 (Tables 7 and 10). Banks
with higher capitalization 1 are affected less but banks with higher capitalization 2
see their deposits fall rapidly. This seems perplexing at first but is understandable
if one considers the accounting identity. As assets equal liabilities plus equity, the
capital in excess of the regulatory requirements allow the banks to absorb the adverse
shock through equity and not necessarily through increase in deposits.
The impact on liquidity is usually positive but insignificant in both cases (Tables
9 and 12). However, size as control is significant in both cases. This suggests that
size of the banks is a relevant characteristic for banks in Pakistan.
5.2.4 Does Liquidity in Combination with Size matter?
Table 13 presents the results of the regressions involving interaction of monetary pol-
icy with liquidity and size as explanatory variable on growth in advances and deposits.
The direct impact of monetary policy on growth in advances is negative and is statis-
tically significant in only one regression (Column 2). In that particular regression, the
double interaction term has an unexpected positive sign but is statistically insignifi-
cant. The double interaction is significant in another regression in which the direct
impact of monetary policy is insignificant (Column 3). This suggest that size in com-
bination with liquidity is not a strong factor in identifying BLC. Neither, given the
size, additional liquidity nor, given the liquidity, additional size has any dampening
impact on growth in advances.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used two different methodologies (VAR and panel data analysis)
to investigate the role of banks in transmission of monetary policy in Pakistan. Our
results show that the bank lending contracts significantly after monetary tightening
at the aggregate level. There is significant contraction in deposits and liquid assets
of the banks too. Thus, after monetary policy shock a reduction in lending does not
imply a simple reallocation of assets from advances to government securities but there
is significant reduction in cash and government bonds as well, a necessary condition
for bank lending channel to work (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Stein, 1998).
We have also investigated the impact of heterogeneity in banks— in terms of size,
liquidity and capitalization—for the transmission of monetary policy signals. Our
assumptions about the linear impact of liquidity supporting the growth of advances
is confirmed. Results also confirm the assumption about market for loans having
stationary size distribution (no monopolistic tendencies). Capitalization, as measured
by capitalization 1, supports growth in advances. But capitalization, as measured by
capitalization 2, does not.
Size and capitalization 2 turn out to be relatively stronger factors in identifying a
bank’s reaction to monetary policy. Small banks react more strongly than other banks
and so do banks with less capital in excess of regulatory requirements. Liquidity and
Capitalization 1 are found to be weaker distinguishing characteristics.
The research performed in this paper can be extended in several different directions
in future. First, we can examine the relationship at a higher frequency e.g on monthly
basis rather than quarterly. Second, we can expand the sample to include all types of
banks in Pakistan e.g. microfinance banks. Third, we can explore other theoretical
explanations of bank lending channel e.g. the risk taking channel. Fourth, we can
include other heterogeneity factors like risk profile of each bank to identify BLC.
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Table 13: Micro-panel results: Effect of bank characteristics - Size & Liquid-
ity - on growth of Advances and Deposits
Dependent variable: Advances Deposits
Quarterly Growth of
AH AB BB AH AB BB
1 2 3 4 5 6
Monetary Policy (MP) -0.018 -0.024 -0.011 -0.020 -0.009 0.000
-0.943 -2.409 -1.457 -1.112 -0.872 0.062
Size -0.222 -0.222 -0.003 -0.374 -0.276 -0.004
-4.631 -2.737 -0.614 -7.400 -3.294 -0.975
Liquidity 0.132 0.185 -0.005 -0.157 -0.142 -0.042
2.049 1.598 -0.306 -2.625 -2.862 -2.359
Size*Liquidity -0.033 -0.006 -0.037 0.012 0.001 -0.006
-0.891 -0.075 -2.657 0.347 0.029 -0.401
IPI 0.286 -0.198 0.806 -0.228 0.364 0.558
0.376 -0.351 4.807 -0.329 0.743 2.833
Size*MP 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.003
0.195 0.711 0.906 0.073 0.129 -0.974
Liq*MP 0.002 -0.005 0.029 0.015 0.006 0.019
0.041 -0.134 1.259 0.318 0.236 1.328
Size*Liquidity*MP 0.008 0.002 0.032 0.094 0.048 0.054
0.211 0.037 2.206 2.793 0.899 2.777
RMSE 0.171 0.130 0.136 0.151 0.112 0.118
AR(1)/AB Test for AR(1) 0.000 0.028 0.055 0.000 0.133 0.036
AR(2)/AB Test for AR(2) 0.000 0.625 0.262 0.000 0.445 0.124
Unit Root (DF) 0.000 0.962 0.000 0.000 0.447 0.000
Unit Root (PP) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.113 0.896 0.036 0.685
Observations 1076 1076 1108 1076 1076 1108
Panel Regression Methods: AH is Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator, AB is Arellano
and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator, BB is Blundel and Bond (1998) system
GMM estimator. Figures in bold indicate significance at 10 percent or lower. For AH,
we use second lag of the endogenous variable in levels (which is first difference in our
case). For AB and BB, we use second and further lags of the endogenous variable but
restrict the size of the instrument matrix to be less than or equal to the number of
panels in our sample Roodman (2009).
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Figure 1: Money Market Interventions of State Bank of Pakistan
 
 
Note: Shaded areas are contractionary (top figure) or expansionary (bottom figure) phases of monetary policy. 
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Figure 2: Response of Aggregate Advances, Deposits and Govt. Securities
to one S.D. shock to Policy Rate
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C Variable Description
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i) Variable Description 
Variable Name  Description 
Assets Total Assets include; 
 1 Cash and Due from other Banks 
 2 Balances with banks 
 3 Lending to Financial Institution 
 4 Investments-Gross 
 5 Advances-Gross 
 6 Fixed Assets  
 7 Deferred Taxes 
 8 Other Assets 
   
Liabilities Total Liabilities include; 
 1 Bills Payable 
 2 Borrowings From Financial Institution 
 3 Deposits And Other Accounts 
 4 Sub-ordinated Loans 
 5 Liabilities Against Assets Subject To Finance Lease 
 6 Deferred Tax Liabilities 
 7 Other Liabilities 
   
Advances Gross Advances 
   Liquid Assets Liquid Assets include; 
 1 Cash & Balances With Treasury Banks 
 2 Balances With Other Banks 
 3 Lending To Financial Institutions 
 4 Federal government securities 
 5 Provincial govt. securities 
   
Deposits As given in balance sheet 
   
Share Capital  As given in balance sheet 
   
Reserves As given in balance sheet 
   
Total Eligible 
Capital 
 Tier 1 + Tier 2 Capital. 
Where Tier 1 = Share capital + Reserves 
              Tier 2 Capital = Sub-ordinated Debt 
   
 
Government 
Securities 
 
Government Securities include; 
 1 Federal government securities 
 2 Provincial govt. securities 
   
Investments Total Investments Gross 
 1 Federal government securities 
 2 Provincial govt. securities 
 3 Fully paid up ordinary shares 
 4 TFCs, Debentures, Bonds, & PTCs 
 5 Other investments 
 6 Total Investments Gross 
   
Size Computed as log(Assets) 
   
Liquidity Computed as Liquid Assets divided by Total Assets 
   
CAR  Defined as Capital Adequacy Ratio. 
 
Computed as; 
 
     
                      
                               
       
 
 
   
Capitalization1 Computed as 
 
                 
                                                
            
 
 
   
Capitalization 2 Defined as the minimum of two excess capital held by banks over and above that required by 
Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) and Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR). Workings are 
as follows; 
 
 
Capitalization 2= Minimum of CapA & CapB 
 
Where; 
 
     1                                                  
 
                                                                              
 
 
ii) Dataset 
a) Data Source 
                                                          
1
 When calculating excess capital based on MCR, Tier 1 capital is to be used. However, we use total eligible capital as a proxy because; 
Quarterly balance sheet data for 32 commercial banks has been used. Commercial banks include 
public sector banks, local private banks and foreign banks. Specialized banks are not included in 
the study.  
 
b) Coverage 
The period under study is from June 2002 to September 2012; a total of 42 quarters. The 
dataset is unbalanced because 6 banks are new. ICBC & Sindh Bank are dropped from the 
sample because of insufficient panel observations (figure below) 
The total observations are 1,281. 
 
 
c) Sample characteristics 
At the start of the period under review, there were 37 commercial banks which have come 
down to 34 by September 2012. The exclusion of ICBC and SINDH Bank causes the number of 
banks to reduce to 32. The period under review has witnessed emergence of 7 new banks and 
16 mergers. Figure below presents the evolving topography of the banking sector since 2002. 
 
  
 
d) Merger Treatment 
Literature cautions against untreated mergers in the dataset. It says that if mergers are not 
accounted for or treated, then jumps in the balance sheets of acquirer bank can falsely imply 
that the balance sheet grew as a result of economic activity. Since there were considerable 
numbers of mergers during the period under study, we adopt the popular treatment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1. The data for Tier  is unavailable before 2005. 
2. Since Tier 1 constitutes 92% of total eligible capital (TEC) that is why TEC is taken as a proxy when computing excess capital based on 
MCR. The excess capital calculated this way will be slightly overstated for very few banks.  
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New Banks (R.H.S) Mergers  (R.H.S) 
Total Banks 
reconstructing the balance sheet backwards of the merged entities as the sum of the merging 
banks before merger2. In practice, it is assumed that these took place at the beginning of the 
sample period, summing the balance-sheet items of the merging parties. For example, if bank A 
is incorporated by bank B at time t, bank B is reconstructed backward as the sum of the merging 
banks before the merger. Banks that underwent mergers and were subsequently treated are as 
follows; 
  Acquirer Bank Merged Bank Period to be Merged 
     
1 Albaraka EGIBL 2007 2010 
2 Summit Rupali 2002 2006 
    Dawood/renamed Atlas 2004 2010 
    Bolan/renamed Mybank 2002 2011 
    Bank of Ceylon 2002 2003 
3 SCB Pak Union bank 2002 2005 
4 NIB PICIC 2002 2009 
    Credit Agricole 2002 2003 
5 Habib Metropoliotan Habib Bank AG Zurich 2002 2006 
6 SAMBA/Crescent Mashreq Doha 2002 2003 
    Trust  2003 2004 
7 Faysal Prime 2002 2006 
    ABN/RBS 2007 2010 
Figures below show graphically the impact of the merger treatment on two banks as an 
example; 
  
 
                                                          
2 Peekan d Rosengren (1995); Kishan and Opiela (2000); Gambacorta (2004) 
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Albaraka & Emirates Global Islamic Bank 
Merger 
Total assets Before Merger Treatment 
Total Assets After Merger Treatment 
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Faysal Bank & Royal Bank of Scotland 
Bank Merger 
Total Assets Before Merger Treatment 
Total Assets After Merger Treatment 
